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_ ..»te of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Robert Van Dyke, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a 
third degree felony, i ii:s Luun nd-j^r^Jicncr. ar.a.: _ A' i ..• . . id*' ; ^ " .-
STATEMENT-^' T'PE ISSUES ' . 
1. Did the officer have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving 
while intoxicated, where an identified citizen-informant c 
Defendant was intoxicated, .. . ;--• * . * . . - - • 
r ( J L V . i ^ \ l i \ VVe;i\rill!r!, v./ifbiin h k i "irii» ( 
• S'^ihrd rf Review. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court reviews the court's factual findings for clear error and its k gai 
conclusions for correctness. State v, Dt inkel, 2006 U i App 339, §\\ h, I 13 r,3d 2L*0. 
2. Did the State violate Defendant's right against self-incrimination when it 
introduced evidence that Defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer or blood 
alcohol tests? 
Standard of Review. Constitutional questions are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, % 7,139 P.3d 1066. 
3. Did the jury have sufficient evidence to conclude that Defendant was 
driving while intoxicated, where Defendant smelled of alcohol, acted slowly and 
lethargically, had glazed and glassy eyes, had difficulty answering questions, was 
observed repeatedly weaving within his lane of traffic, and refused to submit to a 
breathalyzer or a blood alcohol test? 
Standard of Review. On appeal from a jury verdict, this Court "reverse[s] a jury 
verdict only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted/' State v. 
Greene, 2006 UT App 445, % 7,147 P.3d 957 (quotations and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
2 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a person 
from., being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
w ,•- > * "•-. r- -v.f^nrh-: \ /as charged with one count of driving under 
• <> "\ i• • ncv- of alcohol, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Cocie Annotated 
§ 41-6a-5Q2 (West 2004;. R. : I 1 
Defendant subsequently filed a. motion to suppress, claiming that the txai 1 JL 
stop which led to these charges was not s u p p o r t a s:. : t j v - ; . - t - - - : .-JK ,. J -
> , auiuur-, . : . _ \ :, .. il held -in i'\ ultTitiuity hearim mi that motion. 
- '^ ^ * * " ' -' I ri a Icour tissued a written ruling denying that 
•
 r
.^ Io4-73 (Addendum Aj. 
Defendant was also charged with one count of being an alcohol restricted 
driver. R. 1-2. The trial court subsequently granted defendant's motion to sever the 
two counts, R. 91-96,119, and the alcohol restricted, driver count is not at issue in 
this appeal. 
2
 On April 24, 2009, the record was supplemented to include a transcrip! of 
the January 15,2008, evidentiary hearing. That transcript was paginated as R. 328, 
but R. 328 is the same pagination that had already been given to the transcript for 
the first day of trial. To avoid confusion, the State will use Trial, Tr. _ to refer to the 
transcript for the first day of trial, and Evid T> yo refer to the 'transcript for 'he 
evidentiary hearing. 
3 
Defendant also filed a pretrial motion to exclude any reference to his 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. R. 82-85. The trial court denied that 
motion as well. R. 119. 
Defendant was tried before a jury from April 7-8, 2008. R. 182-84, 203-04. 
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury convicted Defendant. R. 203-04. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On September 25,2007, Defendant approached Kim Reynolds, a scorekeeper 
at the Spanish Fork public baseball fields. Trial Tr. 18-20. Defendant was upset 
because the time for his game had been changed. Trial Tr. 21. Although Defendant 
"was nice at first/' "all of a sudden he started getting belligerent, swearing at 
[Reynolds], just yelling." Trial Tr. 20. Defendant "smelled really bad," and 
"smell[ed] like alcohol." Trial Tr. 22. Although Reynolds asked him to leave, 
Defendant remained in Reynolds' office and yelled at her for approximately twenty 
minutes. Trial Tr. 22. 
After leaving Reynolds' office, Defendant went into the parking lot and 
walked toward his car. At this same time, Travis and Heidi Bird were walking to 
3
 When setting out the facts from the record on appeal, "all conflicts and 
doubts" are resolved "in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial 
court." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, f 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
4 
their car along with their three young children. Trial Tr. 28. Defendant came up 
behind the Birds and tried "to strike ivp 3 conversation" with u^ir o-\ eai .. .a ^on. 
Trial Tr. 44. Heidi though! uicA .:u? was ou.; because ~Vc ..•;;_. ... v 
ueienauiii. ii"i _:. .-*, . * . - -,:. • ' :;.:hi; ^ .:-
. u . > :rit; tc ' .. : 
DII ring this encounter, Defendant had "slurred speech" and his eyes were "a 
little glazed and just not altogether there." Trial Tr. 45. Heidi could "smell alcohol" 
coming from Defendant and she later said that Defendant "smelled quite strongly." 
TH*1 Tr. 29-30. Hoid; and ij^vis i\ :,. ;.,.:ic^i \ . :J : \ . ;J ; . . ; . . :• - .-.JK 
odd manner. , ; \ ^ i;\ _;-_H -_ ;- -*_ * .: • - '" r---^:V •-*• -^:. i 
"irer-;:.. •., • ! I, It appeared to her to be ""an 
•*y ;^;r-"' i w '^1 Irial Ir. 52. 
When Defendant got to his car,, he stood "looking across the parking lot for 
several seconds before loading stuff into his car." Tri.ii i\.^o. According io'Iravis, 
Defendant "'seemed to oe :n a srupv . - ' - i/vi fe ai id 
•\''-f-.r, T - --^ r; u v Qiat Defendant was getting into his car and leaving, Travis 
called 911 to report his suspicion. Trial Tr. 46. During that call, Travis gave the 
5 
dispatcher his full name and phone number. 911 Call at 1:25-1:35.4 When asked 
why he thought Defendant was intoxicated, Travis identified three separate reasons: 
(1) Travis believed that Defendant was "just clearly intoxicated" based on "the way 
he was acting"; (2) Travis and his wife had both smelled alcohol on Defendant; and 
(3) Defendant had "tried to strike up a conversation with my little boy." 911 Call at 
1:35-1:55. 
After Travis informed the dispatcher of his suspicion, the dispatcher sent out 
a bulletin requesting that an officer investigate. Trial Tr. 59. Officer Matt Johnson 
spotted Defendant's vehicle shortlv after receiving the disnatch, and he then 
followed Defendant for approximately 9 blocks. Trial Tr. 60; Evid. Tr. 9. 
During that time, Officer Johnson saw Defendant weave within his lane four 
times. Evid. Tr. 9-10. On one those four times, Defendant stayed wholly within his 
lane while he weaved. Evid. Tr. 9-10. On the other three, however, Defendant 
actually traveled "onto [the] line" that separated his lane from the lane to the left, 
thereby "striking the divider lane" with the left side of his car. Evid. Tr. 9, 14. 
4
 The parties did not ever introduce a transcript of the 911 call, but an audio 
recording of the 911 call was introduced at the January 15 evidentiary hearing as 
State's Exhibit 2. Evid. Tr. 5. It is located in the record in a manila folder with the 
caption "Exhibits for Evidentiary Hearing." The State will cite to it as 911 Call at 
(time). 
6 
Although intra-Iane weaving is not illegal, this pattern raised "some red liugr? for 
Officer Johnson rased on his "training; experience, and , ?L^ S^  r\., ;i> ; 
Onhis own, Defendant puttee ^ *oi _ . .. •_-_.:_ : \ . , - :v : * "^  ' ricu 
Tr o4. Umcer johnsor.
 r -.. . . •• • / > " ; ; r i v a l e d his lights. I rial 
r
, - i „>>:iv:\ . ^ . .::;-.-*» -•• " >d his vehicle/' but was ordered back inside bv 
0\{\Qej Johnson Trial Tr. 65. As Off icer Johnson approached Defendant's window, 
hi1 smelled a "strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from [Defendant.-] 
person."'7 Trial Tr, 66. Defendant then started looking in nij. v-.-ic- i s 
registration, which struck O^cer Johnson as odd btxd use n lost motorists keep the 
registration' A\ ::Y^ g-j\-j ~v \ --..--"" A • ^'ficer Johnson talked to 
Defem^-.:... L>^\<' .;,v ' J -*•< .1 - ' -^ch and was slow to respond to the officer's 
Officer Phillip Nielsen arrived to provide backup. In&i J r. :—•-* . .:-
approached Defendant's passenger side door, Officer . % .c.^e: .-::*-_;* *. 
j«n alcoholic beverage" coming iiv;:i i_/<^; ..., >'^  • -- : , ; - '- ^IHLCI 
Nielsen wis-. :,: . ;, • . . . ' . . * ,-^ ' -—mo •; -c; ,wand lethargic/' I r ia l l r . 92. *s 
I he twi» officers were speaking with Defendant, Defendant suddenly grabbed his 
• r-v- iiid started his vehicle. Trial Tr. 92. Officer Nielsen reached in and pulled the 
keys out of the ignition. Trial Tr, 92. 
7 
Officer Johnson asked Defendant to perform some field sobriety tests, but 
Defendant refused. Trial Tr. 69-70. When Officer Johnson asked Defendant why he 
was refusing, Defendant "stated fifth/' Trial Tr. 70, Defendant was then arrested 
for driving under the influence. Trial Tr. 70. As Defendant was being brought back 
to a police car for transportation to the police station, his father arrived on the scene. 
Trial Tr. 95-96. When Defendant saw his father, he looked at him and said "I'm 
sorry, dad." Trial Tr. 95-96. Following Defendant's arrest, Officer Nielsen searched 
his vehicle. Trial Tr. 92. During that search, Officer Nielsen found a cold, unopened 
can of beer. Trial Tr. 92. 
At the police station, Defendant was asked to submit to a blood test to 
determine his blood alcohol level. Trial Tr. 70. Defendant refused. Trial Tr. 71. As 
with his refusal to perform field sobriety tests, Defendant refused by "stat[ing] fifth 
amendment." Trial Tr. 71-72. The booking officer later noted that Defendant's 
"speech was very slurred" and "his eyes had a glassy appearance." Trial Tr. 99. 
Defendant was "a little unstable on his feet and staggered a little bit." Trial Tr. 100. 
The booking officer had to repeat several questions because Defendant "appeared 
incoherent" and "confused." Trial Tr. 99. 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant fir^tcla.ins :;.«; U : : L ^ • •* '-v.- >"?•-
suspicion ,„.,,•, he was J. .^ . i :^ -^rr-.r.r ;s i n c o r r e c t f o r t w u 
r e a s o n s . 
• I •*•••' ''••'- •*• : call alone created reasonable suspicion that Defendant was 
driving while intoxicated. The call was placed by Travis Bird, an identified citizen-
informant who was presumptively reliable. In the call, .ruv;? LOJ~ :.:•. _.:x ..i • r 
that: (1 ) he believed that Defendant was intoxitdfed, \2) \\v .11 KI Ins nii'e h ni both 
smelled alcohol ^ . i ^ ^i^nc;. - . . -. ^ • ; » •*"-* ] ' '- O. acted erratically by 
striking - _ - . • s"-o-< - ' 5 r>-jV vrure; son. This information was 
sufficient i«»•• u pport a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was intoxicated. 
Second, even if the 911 call alone was insufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion, Officer Johnson still developed reasonaoie suspk :^;. ss... .r.-.. *:i :* 
he observed Defendant repeatedly weaving . ; • _ . . . . „; . . • ^ '• a 
case 1 as aenn::i\-cix ...^;: ••-•/.[ ' ~> - * * ' - v r.mber of other courts ha .e 
: . .V'J fi -: -.. — f intra-lane weaving is indicative of intoxication and 
•-j'.orr^ 'or^  can support reasonable suspicion of DUI. When coupled with the LH1 
dispatch, Officer Johnson had an articulable basis for suspecting 
intoxicated. 
9 
Point II: Defendant next claims that the State violated his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination when it introduced testimony that Defendant had 
"pleaded the Fifth/' rather than submitting to a breathalyzer or blood alcohol tests 
at the time of his arrest. The Fifth Amendment only applies, however, when the 
State compels a defendant to testify. The United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have both held that under implied consent laws, a defendant is not 
compelled to submit to such tests. Given the absence of any compulsion, 
Defendant's statements to the officers in this case were voluntary for Fifth 
Amendment purposes. As voluntary statements, they were admissible in this 
prosecution without violating the Fifth Amendment. 
Point III: Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support 
his conviction. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence in support of his 
conviction, however, and this claim should be rejected on that basis alone. 
In any event, multiple witnesses testified that Defendant smelled like alcohol, 
had slurred speech, had balance problems or difficulty walking in a normal 
manner, and had glazed or glassy eyes. In addition, Defendant was seen repeatedly 
weaving within his lane, had difficulty responding to officers' questions, refused to 
take a breathalyzer or a blood alcohol test, and seemed confused and incoherent 
during his booking. When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
10 
this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Defendant was 
driving while intoxicated. 
' Defendant aigiK\s tint hic * \ :;on was invalid for three reasons. First, 
D-.-fen*: - r b ;m - that the initial stop was unconstitutional because Officer Johnson 
did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving while intoxicated. 
Aplt. 3r. 17-26. Second, Defendant argues that his j-ii i;
 4 Amendment right against 
self-incrimination was violated - >_ _ e ru*'_
 r i o - : . u . . • :J-. - •• ^ i 
refused tv, coiirr\, IU ,;.- -:.. . . . ; . - , *-v • ~* W L Dr. 27-31. Third, 
uefen.^a^t :l:ii:: • *' •' " • -"-- —sufficient evidence to support his conviction. 
5-ID. As set forth below, each of these arguments should be rejected.5 
I. 
Of FICER JOHNSON HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 
The Fourth Amendment auer, . - ' . . . : . > •••sout 
[only] unreason i-^-.^.i .h-. . :• 1--'- - - ' " ^ - v - :Aifond, 20Q3UT App 101, U 11, 
r- r~ • :-L:^
 : ^ - e j c r v Vt Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). Given this, it Is vu/11 
established that officers are permitted to conduct brief investigatory stops wiure 
!)
 Defendant presents these arguments in a aiiierent oraer :n L\L$ L . \^L. i. -i 
analytical reasons, the State responds to defendant's argument? -" :he ^rler - i f 
forth above. 
11 
there is "reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot/' United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotations and citation omitted). 
Investigatory stops are not limited to ongoing or prospective crimes, but can also be 
based on reasonable suspicion that the suspect "has been, is, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,110,112 P.3d 507. 
In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer only needs 
"some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. That level of 
suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Alabama v. Wliite, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990} (auotations and citation 
omitted). Courts accordingly look to the "'totality of the circumstances' of each case 
to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' for 
suspecting legal wrongdoing." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (citation omitted). 
In its ruling below, the trial court concluded that the 911 call alone "provided 
sufficient detail of criminal activity" to support the stop, and that this suspicion was 
confirmed when Officer Johnson subsequently observed Defendant weaving within 
his lane. R. 165-66. In response, Defendant now argues that: (1) the 911 call did not 
create reasonable suspicion, Aplt. Br. 22-26, and (2) that Officer Johnson did not 
develop reasonable suspicion when he subsequently observed Defendant weaving 
within his lane. Aplt. Br. 19-22. Defendant is incorrect on both fronts. 
12 
A. The 911 call alone created reasonable suspicion of intoxication. 
It is well established L^r^jiiL^.-^K: .ie\ ^; ; • - ."'* -.w •• ^ sedon 
areportfromd^:i-.:ji.- :.:,v .../:. >:••' - v - ' ^ ' ? "'>' L'l 3- * *; ±143/999P.2d7. 
When I he citizen identifies himself, "reliability and veracity are generally assumed;'' 
State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, % 18, 48 P.3d 872 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Thus, reports from identified citizens "need[ ] no independent proof oi raid,••i.:;\ r 
veracity;" State v. Comer, 2002UTApp 2lyi, \ 22, JJ F.^d JO (quotations i^nd i iiati« mi 
o m i t t e d ) ; sec iil>o ^ Uitc z\ KCLIIL! «uu8 L'T A p p 2hH )\ i '•' I P '\d ^ i. 
: ... ^ . •.•-•.air.'- • • J *h(|i ntiict-'r^ can rrW on a tip when the tip is 
(i . -:- ^ d f ' ^ : •• ''"" "-ugh a 911 dispatcher as long as the dispatcher "possessed 
a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop/' United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 22 L 2 J 3 
(1985). Thus, when a stop Is based on a 911 dispatch, int mi;;^i i:\^ui: \ ...;.- i 
whether the officers who issued the flyer possessed
 ; ^ bo , :J . .-„• - ^ .. 
"whether those relying on the Ih'er nvie themselves awan1 oi the specific facts 
r:iz • .vc. tht-ir-. 'lie ;^ue^ ' '• = :-~7< their assistance/' Id. at 231 (emphasis in original); 
sve ,7/<?n State v. Bruce, 779 R2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989). 
When Travis Bird called 911 in this case, he identified i LIITL^CII v c name, a.. J 
he then gave the dispatcher his phone number for veri; A ,V. V : , ., . - "_?-1 "• 
A s s u c h , this Ccui w a s p r e s u m p i ; \ - J V . •.•...- >: ^  .• i. • -, ; j • : - -^-" der * rrooi of 
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reliability or veracity/' Comer, 2002 UT App 219, % 22 (quotations and citation 
omitted).6 
With respect to the call's content, Travis identified three separate reasons for 
thinking that Defendant was intoxicated: (1) that he believed that Defendant was 
"just clearly intoxicated" based on "the way he was acting"; (2)that Travis and his 
wife had both smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath; and (3) that Defendant had 
"tried to strike up a conversation with my little boy." 911 Call at 1:35-1:55. 
Although Defendant now claims that these three factors did not create reasonable 
suspicion that he was intoxicated, his areuments are unavailing 
First, Defendant is incorrect when he suggests that Travis Bird did not have 
enough information to conclude that he was intoxicated. Aplt. Br. 25-26. 
When evaluating similar claims, courts have historically "permitted lay 
witnesses to testify that a person they observed was intoxicated. In fact, whether 
someone was intoxicated is one of the most common topics on which a lay witness 
6
 Defendant suggests that Travis' reliability might be in question under State 
v. Roybal, 2008 UT App 286,111,191 P.3d 822, cert granted 200 P.3d 193. Aplt. Br. 
25. In Roybal, this Court held that an informant's reliability might be weakened if 
the informant has "some kind of personal involvement" with the suspect. 2008 UT 
App 286, U 11. In this case, however, Defendant was a "stranger" to the Birds, Trial 
Tr. 28, and the record contains no evidence of any connection between the Birds and 
Defendant. Roybal is inapposite. 
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may give an opinion.'"' Barbara E. Bergman and Nancy Hollander, 3 Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence § 12; 8 (15th ed. 2008), In Kaysville v, Mulcahy, this Court 
affirmed this rule, holding that a "conclusory , statement ma; UK- a: ver w as 
intoxicated was the kind of shorthand .sldtenionl oi kul lluil \e\\ \\ itnesscs h,n c 
, ^ c^ur-v> :.,:. •/ - - - : * ' ^ : ^" •" ' ~ ' x ' r«. i r* , ; 
I111 Li U I UI 1 h HIS and I'il a I ions omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Saddler, 2004 
UT105,11 8-10,104 P.3d 1265. This Court explained that because "members of the 
general public have a common knowledge about whether a person is under the 
influence of alcohol, a statement from, a named informant, Do-ea ,,-n ...> own 
personal observations, that a person is a drujiJ^'Ji driver' conveys -uffici^nt 
.n:o:*;. J:.:L . - -.^ v .. .
 v .-.•' •.-
 s
 • -nv.: 'd 
"-•aso ^ y '••? -u -'• >-'•".- * *- •' .  y-±j i .2d at 237 (citation omitted). 
This rule has been widely followed in other jurisdictions. For example, the 
Ohio Supreme Court recently held that 'Virtual!v arr: lav witness .. . mav testifv ns 
to whether an individual appears intoxicatea. j-idti .. .v;.:,-;^;, x , .\ ^ i-r.. J 
(Ol do 2004), Otl ler coui ts ai i.ci con i n i ei itators ha v e agreed See e.g., People v. 
•" * > r'c 'I* V VVr • . ^ \ ' * : s • - ' Observations of signs of intoxication 
are within the competence of the average adult."), cert granted 900 N.E.2d 1125 (111. 
2008); State v. Gowen, 837 A.2d 297, 300 (N.H. 2003) (holding that "a lay person is 
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qualified to identify intoxication"); State v. Goss, 184 P.3d 1155,1158 n.3 (Ore. App. 
2008) ("Whether a person is under the influence of intoxicants is a matter of 
common knowledge, about which a lay witness is competent to render an 
opinion/'); State v. Montgomery, 183 P.3d 267,274 (Wash. 2008) (holding that "a lay 
person's observation of intoxication is an example of a permissible lay opinion"); 23 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1431 (2009) ("Any witness who has observed an individual 
may state, based on his observations, whether that individual was under the 
influence of alcohol."). 
In this case, Travis Bird concluded that Defendant was intoxicated after 
encountering him in a parking lot. Travis Bird later explained that he based this 
conclusion on Defendant's "demeanor," his "slurred speech," "the way he was 
walking," and the fact that Defendant's eyes "seemed a little glazed and just not 
altogether there." Trial Tr. 45. Although Travis Bird did not convey all of these 
details to the dispatcher, he was not required to in order to create a reasonable 
suspicion. As explained in Mulcahy, the fact that a witness "reported a 'drunk 
individual' without explaining why he thought the person was drunk does not by 
itself nullify reasonable suspicion." 943 P.2d 231,237 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations 
and citations omitted), overruled on oilier grounds by State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 
H 8-10,104 P.3d 1265. 
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In short, as a lay witness, Travis was qualified to conclude that Defendant was 
intoxicated, and the 911 dispatcher was entitled to rely on that conclusion because 
Travis Bird was an identified citizen informant who was pre: u:np::\ tvv • ..-.-. . 
I his, alone, sup-r- . : . . — - . . - . - - .•:•;» ^ •• •'•• -« 5 
Second, even if Travis' conclusion alone was insufficient, he offered further 
detail when he informed the dispatcher that he and his wife had smelled alcohol on 
Defendant. In response, however, Defendant argues that the "'odor of alcohol is 
neither illegal nor indicative of criminal ^enav,.\ , *._: -, ..•- . . •. • vu '\vv- s 
correc: .n^c :;L^ - ; . . c .-i ctu ' - ' b d l > n v [- ::*'-' ":* ; '" "* "Uvrris'*; ~-t!~e 
- •-• ! . .':.'-' • •* ' --W.r-.^ ; criminal behavior." Apit. Br. 26. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 (Supp. 2008), a person cannot drive 
while intoxicated. Utah courts have thus accordingly held that the odor of alcohol 
can. support a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated, thereby justifying an 
investigatory stop. ^ ^ „ ; : , : . . . ,. . lZ 1 " " '"7 - : : < Q - r a t •; :u t 
•-'";• - ,: *• ' • ' - ^ ^ ' v ^ '-"icion that a driver is 
intoxicated "can be made very quickly" "where the smell of alcohol is obvious"); 
State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185-86 (Utah App. 1996) (concluding that an officer 
had reasonable suspicion of intoxication after "smelling alcohoi oi i U'K driver ai id 
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observing signs of intoxication"); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984,988 (Utah App. 1994) 
("This court has previously found that smelling alcohol on the breath of a defendant 
is an articulable fact supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion."); Bountiful City v. 
Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah App. 1990) (finding that an officer had 
reasonable suspicion of impairment when he "smelled alcohol on defendant's 
breath"). Thus, contrary to Defendant's claim, the odor of alcohol clearly supported 
Travis's conclusion that he was intoxicated. 
Third, Defendant is also incorrect when he suggests that his encounter with 
the Birds' 6-year old son could not also support a reasonable suspicion that he was 
intoxicated. To the contrary, courts have commonly held that a defendant's unusual 
or erratic behavior can create a reasonable suspicion that a person was intoxicated. 
In State v. Hogue, for example, this Court held that there was reasonable suspicion of 
impairment based on the defendant's "dilated pupils, nervous demeanor, and jerky 
body movements." 2007 UT App 86, | 8,157 P.3d 826. In State v. Brownlee, this 
Court similarly concluded that there was reasonable suspicion of intoxication based 
on the defendant's "lasting confusion and strange behavior[,] combined with his 
bloodshot eyes." 2000 UT App 202U, * 1 (Addendum B). In Harris v. State, a Texas 
appellate court likewise concluded that there was reasonable suspicion that a 
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defendant was intoxicated when officers observed him "dancing in the street and 
waiving his arms/' 913 S.W.2d 706, ,V-; . * e\. Lrmi. .-^pp. 1 -'^'~ •. 
• -'. In this case, Defendant*.^ as nc:jii-wii«, •. ^ i o — '•' >r: 
ii i itiated a com ^ ersation with the 6 year-old as the boy was walking to his car witl t 
his parents and siblings after a family outing. Trial Tr, 28. Defendant was not a 
neighbor or family friend, nor was he the coach of ihr 6 \ ear-cld's baseball team; 
instead, he was a complete "stranger/' i riai 1i. ^?. 
More importantly./the converse ;^ . -^ • . . . . . , ' 
] *-' *' : •'-'" * ** • raiiuuiii o yeai-oid boy. iriai Tr. 23. Although not 
conclusive, Defendant's conversation with the Birds' young son was at least odd. 
When coupled with Travis' other observations, this erratic behavior supported 
Travis' conclusion that Defendant may have been impaired. 
In short, die vi I ujsjjctuiiei reo/ivt'd a tip lumu .t u'iiable, identified witness 
\ 1 to 1 Lc L :i (1 ) • zoncluded that Defendant was intoxicated, (2) smelled alcohol on 
Defendant , and ?;i observed Defendant acting erratically 111 pULULv-. Tiiii was 
sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, thereby justifying the stop. 
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B. Officer Johnson also developed reasonable suspicion when he 
observed Defendant weaving within his lane. 
As noted by the trial court below, even if the 911 call alone did not create 
reasonable suspicion, Officer Johnson still developed reasonable suspicion when he 
observed Defendant repeatedly weaving within his lane. R. 165-66. In response, 
Defendant now argues that intra-lane weaving is not indicative of intoxication and 
therefore cannot support reasonable suspicion. Aplt. Br. 21. Defendant is incorrect. 
Defendant first suggests that intra-lane weaving cannot support reasonable 
suspicion because it is not illegal. Aplt. Br. 20-21. To the contrary, it is well settled 
that the reasonable suspicion doctrine does allow officers to investigate suspicious 
conduct that is nevertheless legal. See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78; Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Thus, "an officer is not obligated to rule out 
innocent conduct prior to initiating an investigatory detention/' Markland, 2005 UT 
26, If 17, and the "mere fact that particular conduct may be susceptible of an 
innocent explanation does not establish a lack of reasonable suspicion." United 
States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2004). Defendant's arguments to the 
contrary are incorrect.7 
7
 Contrary to Defendant's claim, this Court's decisions in Sandy City v. 
Thorsness, 77% P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1998), and State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah 
App. 1987), do not compel a different result. Aplt. Br. 20-21. In both cases, this 
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Second, Defendant is also incorrect when he claims that "weaving within * 
single traffic [lane] is indicative of normal behavior and does not give n^e . 
reasonable suspic i o i\.
 (' i. -pi i\ L / *•. — x. 
I - • -*ingc?ir -v-^fP-easf^r.H!^ ^ - i c i o n . The first is State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 
(Utah ^rr*. 1994). In that case, an officer was traveling west on 1-70 "when he 
noticed Bello's eastbound pickup truck temporarily drift so that it straddled both 
eastbound lanes of traffic." Id. at 585. The officer then turned around anu ic-iioweu. 
Bello ior approximateiv :\w ::;t,c;:. . curing r i t . . ;. ... •_. -? olliu.:1] 'observed n ) 
L.; 'U;L
 r ; ; -Lv^ t .:^i ..L.!^. ~J; \ . \ ; * ::\\p:.i:-s • i nd the officer lat^r 
t • >-« '.^/or^ J -• * •- - - extreme wind conditions that day that might 
account for the temporary drilling ui ihe iruck into rhe oiher lane." L1 
• On appeal, this Court held that the officer did not develop reasonable 
suspicion of impairment when he observed Bello "temporarily v.; n,; ,, :nrn..; - :ane. 
id, at 5to-t>/. bul tins L-uurl did nut i^u*; it iulu lorbidding the use oi inU^Aave 
Court held that there was no reasonable suspicion where officers had not observed 
the suspects either (1) violating traffic laws, or (2) driving in a manner indicative of 
intoxication. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d at 1.161 n.l; Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1013. Given that 
these holdings were both phrased in the disjunctive, however, both cases would 
have allowed the stop if the officer had observed driving that was indicative of 
intoxication—even if the driver had not actually violated a traffic ordinance. These 
cases therefore do not support Defendant's claim. 
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weaving in subsequent cases. Instead, this Court expressly tied its conclusion to the 
unique facts of that case. According to the Court, the "single incident of weaving" 
at issue was not suggestive of impairment because of the "extreme wind conditions, 
the type of vehicle driven by Bello, and the complete absence of any further traffic 
violations or any other indicia of impairment." Id. at 587. 
This Court reinforced the case-specific nature of Bello in State v. Fanari, 1998 
WL 1758329 (Utah App. 1998) (unpublished) (attached as Addendum C). In Fanari, 
the officer observed a "three-quarter mile pattern of weaving back and forth," 
during which the defendant "was going . . . to the fog line, then back across to the 
center line." Id. at *1. Unlike Bello, this Court held that this intra-lane weaving did 
create a reasonable suspicion of impairment in that case. Id. This Court specifically 
distinguished Bello, holding that while there had only been a "single instance [ ]of 
weaving" at issue in Bello, the stop was justified in Fanari because the officer had 
observed "a pattern" of intra-lane weaving. 1998 WL 1758329 at *1. 
Although Fanari was unpublished, this Court should now expressly adopt its 
conclusion as the rule in Utah—thereby allowing officers to stop vehicles based on 
a pattern of intra-lane weaving. 
This conclusion is consistent with the approach taken by the large majority of 
courts from other jurisdictions that have considered this question. In People v. Perez, 
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for example, the court held that intra-lane weaving can support reasonable 
suspicion of impairment for two independent reasons. 221 Cal.Rptr. 776-78 (Cal. 
Dep't Super. Ct. 1985). First, "weaving within one's lane for substantial distances" 
can "give rise to a reasonable suspicion that one is driving under the influence." Id. 
Second, intra-lane weaving is also "indicative of possible equipment violations (i.e., 
faulty wheel alignment, problem in the steering mechanism or defect in the tires)." 
Id. at 778. In such cases, an officer has "the right to determine exactly what was 
causing the vehicle to weave" in order to protect public safety. Id. 
The California Court of Appeals recentlv reaffirmed this rule, specificallv 
x x J x J 
concluding that "[wjeaving within a lane is a widely-recognized characteristic of an 
intoxicated driver." Arburn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 151 Cal.App.4th 1480,1485 
(Cal. App. 2007). The court further stressed that while Perez had involved weaving 
over three quarters of a mile, "the distance of observation is not a controlling factor 
in evaluating a traffic stop." Arburn, 151 Cal.App. 4th at 1485-86. Instead, weaving 
"for even the length of a block may signify that something is amiss," and officers 
who observe such weaving have "the right and the duty to determine exactly what 
was causing" the car "to weave and whether [the driver] could continue driving 
without presenting a safety risk." Id. 
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In People v. Greco, the Illinois Appellate Court recently identified a "general 
consensus" amongst the states that"weaving within a single lane may be a basis for 
a valid traffic stop." 783 N.E.2d 201,205 (111. App. Ct. 2003). Although not uniform, 
this permissive rule has accordingly been applied in a large number of jurisdictions. 
See, e.g., Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 699-701 (Alaska 1978) (allowing a stop where 
the defendant's vehicle was seen "weaving... from the center line to the righthand 
edge," even though "at no time did the . . . vehicle swerve into any other lane"); 
State v. Blake, 718 P.2d 171, 173, 175-76 (Ariz. 1986) (allowing a stop where 
defendant's vehicle was observed "meanderine within its lane"); Roberts v. Florida, 
732 So.2d 1127,1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("Roberts' continuous weaving, even 
if only within her lane,.. . presented an objective basis for suspecting that she was 
under the influence."); State v. Gedeon, 611 N.E.2d 972, 972-73 (Ohio App. 1992) 
("Based on the foregoing, weaving within one's lane alone presents a sufficient 
scenario for an officer to conduct an investigative stop"); Neal v. Commonwealth, 498 
S.E.2d 422, 425 (Va. App. 1998) (holding that while an "isolated instance of mild 
weaving within a lane is not sufficiently erratic to justify an investigatory stop," 
"repeated weaving in one's own lane" can create reasonable suspicion). 
In this case, Officer Johnson followed Defendant for approximately nine 
blocks. Evid. Tr. 9. During that time, he saw Defendant weave within his lane four 
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times. Evid. Tr. 9-10. On one of those four times, Defendant stayed wholly within 
his lane while he weaved. Evid. Tr. 9-10. On the other three, however, Defendant 
actually traveled "onto [the] line" that separated his lane from the lane to the left, 
thereby "striking the divider lane" with the left side of his car. Evid. Tr. 9,14. 
This amount of weaving is well within the range of weaving that has 
supported stops in other cases. See, e.g., Greco, 783 N.E.2d at 206 (allowing the stop 
where the defendant was observed weaving "two or three times from the center of 
the road towards the curb"); State v. Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d 736, 737-40 (Iowa App. 
1993") fallowing the stop where defendant was observed weaving "at least three, but 
not more than six" times); State v. Field, 847P.2d 1280,1281-86 (Kan. 1993) (allowing 
a stop where defendant was observed weaving approximately five times within his 
lane); State v. Huckin, 847 S.W.2d 951,952-56 (Mo. App. 1993) (allowing a stop where 
defendant was observed weaving within his lane four times); State v. Thomte, 413 
N.W.2d 916, 917-20 (Neb. 1987) (allowing a stop where defendant was observed 
weaving within his lane twice); State v. Watson, 472 S.E.2d 28,28-30 (N.C. App. 1996) 
(allowing a stop where defendant was observed weaving within his lane for 
approximately 15 seconds); State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115,115-17 (N.D. 1984) 
(allowing a stop where defendant was observed weaving within his lane for i/8 to 1/4 
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of a mile); State v. Bailey, 624 P.2d 663, 664 (Or. App. 1981) (allowing a stop where 
defendant was observed weaving within his lane for 4-5 blocks). 
Although Defendant now points to a small number of cases holding that 
intra-lane weaving does not support reasonable suspicion, Aplt. Br. 21, these cases 
clearly represent the minority view. As recently recognized by the Vermont 
Supreme Court, the "overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions 
holds that repeated intra-lane weaving can create reasonable suspicion of impaired 
operation/7 and the "[decisions superficially to the contrary tend to involve isolated 
incidents of conduct or conduct less clearly related to impairment/' State v. Pratt, 
932 A.2d 1039,1041 (Vt. 2007). Moreover, while Defendant also points to the Tenth 
Circuit's conclusion that a failure to "follow a perfect vector down the highway" 
does not create reasonable suspicion of impairment, Aplt. Br. 19 (quoting United 
States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 974 (10th Cir. 1993)), the Tenth Circuit has subsequently 
suggested that intra-lane weaving can support a reasonable suspicion of 
impairment. See United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194,1196-1200 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Moreover, the majority rule is also supported by a recent study that was 
conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in which the 
NHTSA specifically concluded that"weaving'7 is indicative of intoxicated driving. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The Visual Detection of DWI 
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Motorists: Introduction (hereinafter NHTSA Study) (reprinted in full as Addendum D) 
(available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/dwi/ dwihtml/ 
index.htm). Importantly, the NHTSA defined "weaving" to include intra-lane 
weaving, explaining that "weaving" occurs "when the vehicle alternately moves 
toward one side of the lane and then the other." NHTSA Study: Explanation oftlte 24 
Driving Cues. According to the NHTSA, such activity is indicative of intoxication 
because "[maintaining proper lane position can be a difficult task for an impaired 
driver." Id. 
The NHTS A's conclusions are consistent with Officer Johnson's testimony in 
this case. Although Officer Johnson stated that Defendant did not violate any traffic 
laws, he nevertheless testified that Defendant's driving pattern raised "some red 
flags" based on his "training" and "experience" as a police officer. Trial Tr. 65. 
In short, Defendant is incorrect when he suggests that allowing officers to 
consider intra-lane weaving would "impose no standard at all" and grant officers 
"unfettered discretion." Aplt. Br. 19. The authority discussed above instead 
demonstrates a pronounced national consensus to the contrary. Officers therefore 
should be allowed to conduct investigatory stops when they observe patterns of 
intra-lane weaving. 
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C Taken together, the tip and observed behavior created reasonable 
suspicion that Defendant was driving while intoxicated. 
When evaluating reasonable suspicion, courts do not " evaluate individual 
facts in isolation/' State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 14,147 P.3d 425. Rather, courts 
look to the "'totality of the circumstances' to determine whether, taken together, the 
facts warranted further investigation by the police officer." Id. (citation omitted). 
Thus, when an officer receives a tip regarding possible criminal activity, and 
the officer then observes the suspect engaging in suspicious behavior, the tip and 
the conduct are considered together when evaluating reasonable suspicion. As 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court, the Constitution "does not prevent police 
officers from using tips without any indicia of reliability if, in addition to such tips, the 
officer's own observations give the officer a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity." 
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 18 (emphasis added); see also Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 25 n.2. 
In addition, the reasonable suspicion standard also takes into account an officer's 
training and experience in determining whether the observed conduct is suggestive 
of criminality. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 11; State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, f 8, 
128 P.3d 28. 
In this case, Officer Johnson knew that a citizen informant had encountered 
Defendant in a parking lot and had then called 911 to report that Defendant was 
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intoxicated. Officer Johnson also knew that Defendant was having at least some 
difficulty driving, as evidenced by the fact that the fact that Defendant had weaved 
within his lane four times over a 9 block period, actually driving onto "onto [the] 
line" on three of those occasions. Evid. Tr. 9,14. 
In these circumstances, Officer Johnson had an articulable basis for suspecting 
that Defendant was driving while intoxicated, and "[i]t would have been poor 
police work indeed for an officer of [Officer Johnson's] experience... to have failed" 
to stop Defendant and investigate further. Teny, 392 U.S. at 23. The trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed. 
II. 
THE STATE DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN IT INTRODUCED 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO PERFORM FIELD 
SOBRIETY AND BLOOD ALCOHOL TESTS 
Defendant next argues that his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated when the State presented evidence that he had refused to 
complete the field sobriety tests or chemical tests. Apit Br. 27-30. Defendant's 
argument should be rejected. 
The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being "compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself/7 United States Const, amend. V. In 
South Dakota v. Neville, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the 
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Fifth Amendment prohibits a state from presenting evidence that a defendant 
refused to take a blood alcohol test. 459 U.S. 553, 554-66 (1983). As a threshold 
matter, the Court explained that the Fifth Amendment's bar against unlawful 
compulsion only applies when the state presents a defendant with the choice of 
either testifying against himself, or instead " submit [ting] to a test so painful, 
dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that almost inevitably a 
person would prefer confession/' Id. at 563 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Turning to the specific question before it, the Court noted that South Dakota 
required a defendant to choose between submitting to a blood alcohol test "or 
having his refusal used against him" in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 563. While the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that this "choice . . . will not be an easy or pleasant 
one for a suspect to make," the Court concluded that this choice is not sufficiently 
compulsive so as to implicate the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 564. As noted by the 
Court, "the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make 
difficult choices." Id. In these circumstances, "a refusal to take a blood alcohol test 
. . . is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege 
against self-incrimination." Id. In a subsequent case, the Court extended this 
holding to a defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test as well. See 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 604 n.19 (1990). 
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The rule set forth in Neville was expressly endorsed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1987). As in this case, the State in Larson 
sought to use evidence of the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test 
against him in a DUI prosecution, but the defendant claimed that this violated his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Id. at 139-40. 
In analyzing this claim, the Supreme Court first noted that Utah had an 
implied consent statute that applied to field sobriety tests and blood alcohol tests. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (West 1983). Larson, 733 P.2d at 140. Under that 
statute, a person who operated a motor vehicle was deemed to have given his 
consent to submit to a breathalyzer or blood alcohol test. Id. The State was 
accordingly allowed to penalize a motorist for refusing to take a test by either: (1) 
revoking the motorist's driver's license, or (2) "us[ing] the refusal against the 
defendant in any action arising out of the incident, including a criminal prosecution 
o 
for driving while intoxicated." Id. at 140. 
Relying on Neville, the court in Larson ultimately concluded that such 
penalties are not unconstitutionally compulsive under the federal constitution. Id. 
The current version of that statute is found in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-
520(l)(a) (West 2004). 
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In State v. East, the Utah Supreme Court then extended this ruling to field sobriety 
tests and breathalyzer tests. 743 P.2d 1211,1211-12 (Utah 1987). 
Thus, given the implied consent statute, a Utah motorist cannot claim that he 
was "compelled" to submit to field sobriety tests, a breathalyzer, or a blood alcohol 
test for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Larson, 733 P.2d at 139-40; see also Muniz, 
496U.S.at604n.l9. 
Given the absence of any compulsion, Defendant's statements in this case 
regarding his refusal to submit to the tests were voluntary for Fifth Amendment 
Duruoses. As voluntarv statements, thev were not protected bv the Fifth 
X X * m X J 
Amendment. As explained by the Supreme Court, '"far from being prohibited by 
the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently 
desirable.... Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions."' Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 
(1977)). Thus, "[vjoiuntary statements 'remain a proper element in law 
enforcement/" Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,478 (1966)). 
While Defendant's refusal therefore subjected him to both civil penalties and 
the adverse use of his refusal at a criminal trial, those sanctions did not 
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unconstitutionally compel him to act as a witness against himself. As a result, his 
statements were voluntary statements that were admissible in this prosecution. 
In response, Defendant first claims that the evidence should have been 
suppressed under State v. Fish, 893 P.2d 1023 (Or. 1995). Aplt. Br. 28-29. In Fish, the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that the defendant's rights were violated when the 
government introduced evidence regarding his refusal to comply with field sobriety 
tests. Fish, 893 P.2d at 1024-32. The decision in Fish, however, was expressly 
predicated on the Oregon State Constitution, and the Oregon Supreme Court 
specifically held that its decision was not based on "the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution." Id. at 1032 n.10. Fish therefore 
has no bearing on this case. 
Defendant also cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), in support of his 
Fifth Amendment claim. Aplt. Br. 27. In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that the 
State cannot use a defendant's post-Miranda silence for purposes of impeaching the 
defendant at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20 (1976). According to the 
Court, such use 'Violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Id. at 619. In Wainwright v. Greenfield, however, the Court stressed that "Doyle did 
not rely on the contention" that the government had also "violated the defendants' 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by asking the jury to draw 
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an inference of guilt from the exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent/7 
474 U.S. 284, 291 n.7 (1986). Thus, "the Doyle analysis rests on the Due Process 
Clause, not the Fifth Amendment/' Id. at 639 n.10. In this case, however, Defendant 
has not separately raised or briefed a challenge under the Due Process Clause, nor 
has he separately briefed an analysis under Doyle or its progeny. Doyle therefore is 
inapposite to this case. 
Finally, Defendant briefly cites to Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
as support for his claim. Aplt. Br. 30. Defendant did not refer to the state 
constitution in his motion below, however, but instead relied exclusively on the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. R. 82-85. As such, this state 
constitutional claim is not preserved. In addition, defendant also fails to offer any 
"unique state constitutional analysis" in his brief to this Court, instead only offering 
" [cjursory references to the state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated 
to a federal constitutional claim." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f t 18-19,164 P.3d 
397. As such, his state constitutional claim is not properly before this Court. Id. 
In any event, the Utah Supreme Court in Larson specifically concluded that 
the implied consent statute was not compulsive for purposes of the state 
constitution. Larson, 733 P.2d at 140. Thus, even if reached, Defendant's state 
constitutional argument should be rejected. 
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In sum, a defendant does not have a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to 
submit to field sobriety tests or blood alcohol tests. Instead, citizens voluntarily 
consent to such tests as a precondition for driving, and the State therefore does not 
act in a compulsory fashion when it asks a defendant to submit to such tests. In this 
case, Defendant's responses to the officers' lawful requests were voluntary and 
therefore not covered by any Fifth Amendment privilege. 
III. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Finally, Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction. Aplt. Br. 15-16. According to Defendant, the evidence was insufficient 
because it only showed that he had "operated his vehicle in a cautious/overly 
cautious fashion." Aplt. Br. 16. Defendant also claims that the record "is absent of 
an observations of a traffic violations of any impairment." Aplt. Br. 16. Defendant's 
argument should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, Defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling requirement. 
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a "party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." In order to comply with this requirement, an appellant must "must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
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introduced at trial [that] supports the very findings" the appellant challenges on 
appeal. State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, Tf 13, 51 P.3d 21 (emphasis in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted). The marshaling requirement applies "on a 
sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict/' State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, | 22, 69 P.3d 
1278, and this Court has "shown no reluctance to affirm the jury's verdict when a 
party fails to meet its marshaling burden." Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 
UT App 355,114,993 P.2d 222; accord Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, f 15. In this case, 
Defendant "has not acknowledged., let alone marshaled,, the evidence presented at 
trial." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 14,989 P.2d 1065. Given this failure, this Court 
should not address Defendant's sufficiency claim on its merits. See id. at f 16. 
Second, even if addressed, Defendant's sufficiency challenge still fails. This 
Court gives "broad deference to the fact finder," and its "power to review a jury 
verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Pearson, 
1999 UT App 220, % 15,985 P.2d 919 (quotations and citations omitted). Specifically, 
a "jury is entitled to use its own judgment on what evidence to believe and may 
draw reasonable inferences from that evidence." Id. (quotations and citations 
omitted). Further, "as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the 
jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343-
44 (Utah 1997) (quotations and citation omitted). Given this, a sufficiency challenge 
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only succeeds when the party " demonstrate[s] that the evidence is insufficient when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict/" Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 22 
(citation omitted). This only occurs when the evidence is so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted/7 
Brown, 948 R2d at 343 (Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
Defendant's conviction was amply supported by the evidence. Three 
different witnesses testified that Defendant smelled like alcohol. Trial Tr. 22 (Kim 
Reynolds); Trial Tr. 29 (Heidi Bird); Trial Tr. 66 (Officer Johnson). A fourth witness 
testified that while officers only found one closed beer can in Defendant's car, there 
was still an "odor of an alcoholic beverage" coming from the vehicle. Trial Tr. 91-92. 
Three different witnesses testified that Defendant had slurred speech. Trial Tr. 45 
(Travis Bird); Trial Tr. 68 (Officer Johnson); Trial Tr. 99 (Officer Herrin). Three 
different witnesses testified that Defendant had balance problems or difficulty 
walking in a normal manner. Trial Tr. 28-30, 32 (Heidi Bird); Trial Tr. 45 (Travis 
Bird); Trial Tr. 100-02 (Officer Herrin). Two witnesses testified that Defendant's 
eyes were glazed or glassy. Trial Tr. 45 (Travis Bird); Trial Tr. 99 (Officer Herrin). 
In addition, Defendant began the evening by engaging in an angry 20 minute tirade 
against a volunteer at a recreational ballpark (Trial Tr. 20-22), then had a "loud" 
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encounter in a parking lot in which he tried chatting up a 6 year-old boy that he had 
never met before (Trial Tr. 28-29,44-45), paused in a "stupor" before getting into his 
car (Trial Tr. 46), drove lethargically as he pulled out of a parking lot (Trial Tr. 33-
34), weaved 3-4 times within his lane over the course of 9 V2 blocks (Trial Tr. 78), 
acted "slow" and "lethargic" during the traffic stop (Trial Tr. 92), had difficulty 
while looking for his registration (Trial Tr. 66-67), was slow when answering Officer 
Johnson's questions during the traffic stop (Trial Tr. 68), inexplicably decided to 
start his vehicle while officers were still conducting the traffic stop (Trial Tr. 92), 
apologized to his father when his father arrived on the scene (Trial Tr. 95-96), 
refused to take field sobriety tests at the scene of his arrest (Trial Tr. 69-70), refused 
to take the blood alcohol tests at the jail (Trial Tr. 71-72), and was "a little confused," 
"unstable," and "incoherent" during his booking (Trial Tr. 99-100). 
Taken together, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that 
Defendant drove while intoxicated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J.KENT VANDYKE, j 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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Case No. 071403650 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained 
by the State of Utah in the instant case, to wit, statements and other observations of police leading 
to the Defendant's DUI arrest on September 25, 2007. Having already Ruled and Ordered in Court 
on January 16, 2008 that the Motion to Suppress be denied, the Court now makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Around 6:58pm on September 25, 2007, police dispatch received a phone call 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial Distnct Court 
of Utah CountyJBtate of Utah 
Deputy 
Cherokee with dealer plates turn left onto Main Street from Volunteer Drive, 
where the Sports Park was located. Officer Johnson followed the vehicle 
northbound on Main Street for approximately nine blocks without turning on his 
emergency lights. The Jeep Cherokee pulled to the shoulder of the road at 
approximately 50 North Main Street without any prompting from the police. 
4. At the preliminary hearing on December 19, 2007, Officer Johnson testified that, 
during the nine blocks, he observed that the "vehicle wras traveling on the inside 
divider lane, and it would pull back into the travel lane. It would drift from side-
to-side within the travel lane, and then travel on the divider line, and then travel 
back into the travel lane again." 
5. At the suppression hearing on January 15, 2008, Officer Johnson clarified his 
preliminary hearing testimony in describing that the driver drifted back and forth 
in the right-hand (outside) northbound lane of travel. The left rear wheel of the 
vehicle drove on top of the left hash marks (or left divider line) three times and 
drifted to the left without driving on top of the left hash marks one or two other 
times during the nine blocks of travel. Officer Johnson never saw the vehicle 
signal or change lanes during this observation. 
6. Although there is a conflict between the DUI report form and his written narrative 
report, Officer Johnson maintains that the written narrative report is accurate, and 
that the vehicle turned from Volunteer Drive onto the far outside lane (or number 
2 lane) northbound on Main Street. 
7. Main Street in Spanish Fork is a four-lane road, with a center median strip. There 
3 
car clearly shows that he is not free to leave at that point. 
2. In order for the Defendant to prevail on his Motion to Suppress the level two stop, 
he must persuade the Court that Officer Johnson did not have "reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring." U.C.A. § 77-23-103 (1992). The 
case law, as cited by the Defendant is very clear that simple weaving within the lane 
of travel with nothing more does not amount to reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity has occurred or is occurring. It is difficult to disagree with the language 
quoted by the Defendant in his memo from United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439,446 
(9th Cir. 2002): 
Indeed, if failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway or 
keeping one's eyes on the road were sufficient reasons to suspect a 
person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the public 
would be subject each day to an invasion of their privacy. 
3. The State makes the valid argument that Officer Johnson had more than just the 
Defendant's weaving pattern to justify his activation of his overhead lights. The 
State correctly cites Utah Code Section 77-7-15 for the concept that a police officer 
may "stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." 
4. The Utah Court of Appeals states in the City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 
(Utah App. 1997): "The facts supporting reasonable suspicion may come from the 
officer's own observations as well as 'information, bulletins, or flyers received from 
other law enforcement sources.'...The legality of a stop based on information 
5 
independently corroborated Mr. Bird's observations and dispatch report. 
In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that ''an informant's tip constitutes reasonable suspicion to justify a 
detention or seizure of a vehicle and its driver if the information is reliable, provides 
sufficient detail of criminal activity, and is confirmed by the investigating officer. 
A tip from a citizen informant who gives his or her name is highly reliable because 
the police may verify the information and it subjects the informant to penalty if the 
information is false. Furthermore, unlike a paid police informant, the uncompensated 
citizen-informer's motive is community concern rather than self-interest." 
In this case, the informant identified himself by giving his name and phone number 
to dispatch. Both he and his wife later gave written statements to police that were 
used at the preliminary hearing. Their names were Travis and Heidi Bird (who was 
in the background during the dispatch call), citizen informants who called dispatch. 
The information they told dispatch was relayed to Officer Johnson in written form 
on his laptop computer. That information included an accurate description of the 
vehicle and its location. It also included Mr. Bird's conclusion that the Defendant 
was intoxicated and his reasons for that belief. 
In addition to the Defendant's repeated weaving within the lane, Officer Johnson had 
been told by dispatch that he wTas reporting to the area of the Sports Park on a report 
of an intoxicated motorist. Officer Johnson wras able to quickly find a car that 
matched the description of the information given to him by dispatch, i.e. a green-
colored Jeep Cherokee with dealer plates with the same number relayed by Mr. Bird. 
7 
Defendant's rights. 
13. Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
r<K 
SIGNED this I day of _ H / J^KI ,2008. 
Claudia Layc^cjf - ^ .^
 v «; .". *• r,: r, Judge• 
Fourth District Court Judae —~ ,-.r-: '. 




Not Reported in P,3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244167 (Utah App.), 2000 UT App 202 
(Cite as: 2000 WL 33244167 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William BROWNLEE, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 981295-CA. 
June 29, 2000. 
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee. 




*1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress, arguing Deputy Fountaine FN I lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. We 
affirm. 
FN1. Defendant argues that Deputy Foun-
taine lacked probable cause, but the proper 
standard for detention is reasonable suspi-
cion. See State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 
1227 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
Three levels of constitutionally permissible encoun-
ters between police and citizens exist: 
" '(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at any-
time [sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an "articulable sus-
picion" that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or 
is being committed.' " 
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
The State concedes the encounter here escalated to 
a level two stop when Deputy Fountaine removed 
his gun from his holster, thereby seizing the de-
fendant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See 
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). Thus, a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity was required to justify Deputy 
Fountaine's seizure of defendant. "While 
'reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard 
than probable cause and requires a showing consid-
erably less than preponderance of the evidence, the 
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level 
of objective justification for making the 
stoprillinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 
673, 675-76, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Under the 
Fourth Amendment, an officer's reasonable suspi-
cion may be justified by " 'unusual conduct' that 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude 'that 
criminal activity may be afoot.' " State v. Rodrig-
uez Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). " 'Whether 
there are objective facts to justify such a stop de-
pends on the "totality of the circumstances." ' " 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992), affd$15 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
Defendant claims Deputy Fountaine did not have 
sufficient articulable facts to justify a reasonable 
suspicion that he was intoxicated, arguing that 
bloodshot eyes and confusion do not support a reas-
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ORME. 
*1 "If reasonable in scope, a traffic stop based on 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the 
driver has violated 'any one of the multitude of ap-
plicable traffic and equipment regulations' is lawful 
under the Fourth Amendment."State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400 
(1979)). Appellant correctly notes that, combined 
with other mitigating circumstances, a "single in-
stance of weaving ... cannot serve as the constitu-
tional basis for stopping" a driver for suspicion of 
driving while impaired, nor for violating Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-61(1) (1993), which requires drivers to 
operate their vehicles "as nearly as practical" with-
in a single lane. State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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(Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied,**! P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1994). The other mitigating circumstances present 
in Bello were the extreme wind, the camper shell on 
the driver's vehicle which "caused it to catch the 
wind more easily than other vehicles," and that, 
after a single weaving incident, the officer 
"observed no further weaving." Id." '[I]f failure to 
follow a perfect vector down the highway ... were 
sufficient reason[ ] to suspect a person of driving 
while impaired," the court noted, "a substantial por-
tion of the public would be subject each day to an 
invasion of their privacy.' " Id. (quoting United 
States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir.1993)). 
Far from merely failing to follow a perfect vector 
down Highway 1-70, appellant engaged in a three-
quarter mile pattern of weaving back and forth. 
Trooper Avery testified that appellant "was going 
... to the fog line, then back across to the center line 
[and] not staying right in that lane.... [Appellant's 
car] would hit the white fog line, then it would hit 
the center line, and then it would ... come back in 
his lane, then he'd drift over again."This testimony 
describes a pattern, not a single instance, of weav-
ing. Moreover, unlike the vehicle in Bello, appel-
lant's Lincoln had no camper or any other trait 
which would cause it to catch wind more easily 
than other vehicles. In sum, after observing appel-
lant's driving pattern Trooper Avery based his stop 
of appellant on a reasonable suspicion that appel-
lant had violated section 41-6-61(1) or was driving 
while impaired, and the stop was thus lawful under 
the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, viewed as a 
comprehensive whole, as is appropriate, see State v. 
Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct.App.1997), 
the circumstances present during Trooper Avery's 
stop of appellant provided reasonable suspicion to 
extend the detention's scope. 
Dissecting each of Trooper Avery's bases for suspi-
cion, appellant points to case law indicating that 
nervousness, errant travel plans, criminal histories, 
and field sobriety tests, in and of themselves, do not 
necessarily provide reasonable suspicion to extend 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Contents 
The DWI Detection Guide 
Explanations of the 24 driving cues 
Summary 
A description of post-stop cues that are predictive of DWI 
Introduction 
More than a million people have died in traffic crashes in the United States since 1966, the year of 
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which led to the creation of the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, or NHTSA. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s more than 50,000 people lost their lives each year on our 
nation's streets, roads and highways. Traffic safety has improved considerably since that time: the 
annual death toll has declined substantially, even though the numbers of drivers, vehicles, and 
miles driven all have increased. When miles traveled are considered, the likelihood of being killed 
in traffic during the 1960s was three to four times what it is today. 
The proportion of all crashes in which alcohol is involved also has declined. The declines in crash 
risk and the numbers of alcohol-involved crashes are attributable to several factors, including the 
effectiveness of public information and education programs, traffic safety legislation, a general 
aging of the population, and law enforcement effort. 
NHTSA research contributed to the improved condition, in part, by providing patrol officers with 
useful and scientifically valid information concerning the behaviors that are most predictive of 
impairment. Continued enforcement of DWI laws will be a key to saving lives in the future. For this 
reason, NHTSA sponsored research leading to the development of a new DWI detection guide and 
training materials, including a new training video. Many things have changed since 1979, but like 
the original training materials, the new detection guide describes a set of behaviors that can be 
used by officers to detect motorists who are likely to be driving while impaired. 
Building upon the previous NHTSA study, the researchers interviewed officers from across the 
United States and developed a list of more than 100 driving cues that have been found to predict 
blood alcohol concentrations, or BACs, of 0.08 percent or greater. The list was reduced to 24 cues 
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Problems in Maintaining Proper Lane Position 
Maintaining proper lane position can be a difficult task for an impaired driver. For example, we 
have all seen vehicles weaving before. Weaving is when the vehicle alternately moves toward one 
side of the lane and then the other. The pattern of lateral movement can be fairly regular, as one 
steering correction is closely followed by another. In extreme cases, the vehicle's wheels even cross 
the lane lines before a correction is made. You might even observe a vehicle straddling a center or 
lane line. That is, the vehicle is moving straight ahead with either the right or left tires on the 
wrong side of the lane line or markers. 
Drifting is when a vehicle is moving in a generally straight line, but at a slight angle to the lane. The 
driver might correct his or her course as the vehicle approaches a lane line or other boundary, or 
fail to correct until after a boundary has been crossed. In extreme cases, the driver fails to correct 
in time to avoid a collision. 
Course corrections can be gradual or abrupt. For example, you might observe a vehicle to swerve, 
making an abrupt turn away from a generally straight course, when a driver realizes that he or she 
has drifted out of proper lane position, or to avoid a previously-unnoticed hazard. 
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Impaired drivers also can experience difficulty maintaining an appropriate speed. There is a good 
chance the driver is DWI if you observe a vehicle to, 
• Accelerate or decelerate rapidly for no apparent reason, 
• Vary its speed, alternating between speeding up and slowing down, or be 
• Driven at a speed that is ten miles per hour or more under the limit. 
Back„to_Top 
Vigilance Problems 
Vigilance concerns a person's ability to pay attention to a task or notice changes in surroundings. A 
driver whose vigilance has been impaired by alcohol might forget to turn his or her headlights on 
when required. Similarly, impaired drivers often forget to signal a turn or lane change, or their 
signal is inconsistent with their maneuver, for example, signaling left, but turning right. 
Alcohol-impaired vigilance also results in motorists driving into opposing or crossing traffic, and 
turning in front of oncoming vehicles with insufficient headway. 
Driving is a complex task that requires accurate information about surrounding traffic conditions. 
Failing to yield the right of way and driving the wrong way on a one way street are dangerous 
examples of vigilance problems. 
A driver whose vigilance has been impaired by alcohol also might respond more slowly than 
normal to a change in a traffic signal. For example, the vehicle might remain stopped for an 
unusually long period of time after the signal has turned green. Similarly, an impaired driver might 
be unusually slow to respond to an officer's lights, siren, or hand signals. 
The most extreme DWI cue in the category of vigilance problems is to find a vehicle stopped in a 
lane for no apparent reason. Sometimes when you observe this behavior the driver will be just lost 
or confused, but more than half of the time the driver will be DWI-maybe even asleep at the wheel. 
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Judgment Problems 
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• Driving without headlights at night 
• Failure to signal or signal inconsistent with action 
The probability of detecting DWI by random traffic enforcement stops at night has been found to 
be about three percent (.03). 
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